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The language

X3 is more than one payment.

X3 Force Field begins with written typed `.x3` mandates and payment programs: compiler/type checks refuse unsafe edits, and NEAR Guard checks authenticated 1Click quote terms against policy. The deployed Guard does not run the native X3VM. Follow the public language tools, the recorded mainnet swap and the remaining work that connects source to execution.

Two pipelines, one language

The NEAR integration and the Rust intent toolchain establish different facts. The mainnet payment used Guard and 1Click; it is not evidence of native X3VM execution.

NEAR Intents path · runs in the judge steps
  1. 01

    .x3 source

    Mandate and payment

  2. 02

    Compile

    Parse, type-check, lower

  3. 03

    Guard terms

    Stored policy on NEAR

  4. 04

    1Click quote

    Signature, then terms

Rust intent toolchain · local workspace
  1. 01

    .x3 source

    Strategies and programs

  2. 02

    Rust compiler

    HIR, MIR, backend

  3. 03

    Intent bytecode

    Separate from chain X3BC

  4. 04

    Intent VM

    Local execution and tests

What the compiler refuses

These programs never reach a quote. Each code is a real refusal in the checker that the playground runs.

X3_NEAR_ROUTE_SHAPE

More than one leg, or a fallback. 1Click settles one swap, and a second leg could half-execute with no rollback.

X3_NEAR_SLIPPAGE_REQUIRED

No slippage bound. The compiler will not choose a tolerance on the agent's behalf.

X3_NEAR_TIMEOUT_REQUIRED

No timeout. The deadline is when 1Click starts refunding, so it has to be stated.

X3_NEAR_NONCE

A payment under a mandate with no one-use nonce, or with two. Guard records each payment under its nonce.

X3_NEAR_REFUND_ASSET

A refund in a different asset or on a different chain than the deposit. 1Click refunds the deposited asset only.

X3_NEAR_REFUND_TO

Timeout and on_fail refund to different addresses, or to an address that is not on the origin chain.

X3_NEAR_GUARD_UNENFORCEABLE

A require clause the NEAR path has no way to enforce. It is refused, never silently dropped.

X3_NEAR_ON_FAIL_UNSUPPORTED

on_fail halt or quarantine. 1Click can only refund, so the program would promise something that cannot happen.

X3_NEAR_ROUTE_ENDPOINTS

The leg's assets don't match the intent's from and to.

X3_MANDATE_APPROVAL

An agent listed as its own approver, an approval threshold above the cap, or an impossible threshold.

X3_MANDATE_BOUND

A mandate that leaves slippage or fees unbounded.

X3_MANDATE_LIMIT

A per-payment cap above the daily cap, or a cap that does not fit the contract's u128.

What the public source establishes

Reviewed November 13, 2026. Each component links to the source or execution record behind its claim.

Public X3Lang sourceNEAR + Solana mainnet evidenceRust intent VM: local

Python intent frontend

The public NEAR path parses and checks .x3 mandates and payment intents, lowers supported terms and evaluates the owner policy. Unsafe source edits are rejected before quote submission.

Inspect source and limits

Guard on NEAR

The deployed contract reads authenticated 1Click quote terms and checks the stored mandate. Mainnet invoice_06 passed 21 checks through a restricted agent key before a separately funded deposit.

Inspect source and limits

Rust intent compiler and VM

The public x3-lang workspace compiles, verifies and runs trading programs locally. Its intent bytecode and the chain's X3BC format are distinct; no pallet loads the intent bytecode described in this workspace.

Inspect source and limits

A source trail you can check

The historical Tidepool testnet transfer has a committed .x3 program whose hash was bound before funding. The mainnet `invoice_06` payment and mandate sources now match the SHA-256 identities stored in NEAR Guard, and a later restricted-agent transaction recorded `Settled`. This still does not prove native X3VM execution on-chain.

Inspect source and limits

The broader X3 chain has its own release and deployment requirements. Claims here use the public X3Lang revision and the network named in each evidence record. See Inspect the Proof.

What we're building next

Guard enforces the program hash

Open PR #202

Program-pin enforcement is proposed in PR #202 and is not merged at this evidence snapshot. Storing a source hash does not prove the deployed Guard rejects a different program. The meter waits for the implementation and mismatch tests to land.

Review current work

Scoped agent vault

Local prototypes

NEAR FunctionCall-only and Base EIP-712 vault prototypes have local test coverage. The public testnet runbook still needs an allowed payment and the documented refusal cases. Neither the Tidepool transfer nor invoice_06 proves a scoped vault held the funds.

Review current work

Mandate diff before you sign

Idea

Compile the current and proposed mandate, then show the owner every term that changed (cap, recipients, refund address, expiry) before the create_mandate call goes out. The playground's checker can already produce both term sets.

One checker, three runtimes

Idea

Lower check_mandate to X3BC so the same bytecode runs in the browser, on the X3 chain and in the Guard. That removes the hand-kept ports and gives one parity test where there are three today.

Public refusal feed

Idea

An append-only feed of every agent proposal, with its .x3 hash, the verdict, the rule that decided it, and the transaction when there is one. Hostile-model runs would be labeled as attacks.

LP mandates

Idea

The same mandate shape, applied to liquidity: which pools an LP agent may enter, how much, the maximum price impact, and a fixed withdrawal address. Liquidity managed by an agent, bounded by the owner.

Want one of these sooner, or have a better one? Open an issue.